Iran and Foreign Investment: Restatement of a case
Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries
and Mines
Quarterly Magazine,
Winter, 1994,Vol. 2, No. 3-4, PP. 5-10
According to historical data, the Iranian government
turned to rather heavy borrowing from Western financial sources almost at a time when the
phenomenon had just appeared on the scene. In most cases, we regret to say, these we used
for extravagant consumption purposes. The loans usually were received against granting of
"concessions" which ranged from customs farming to never-to-be built national
railway lines, and from exploring oil fields to setting up a bank. Many of these carried
clear monopoly right which made the term "concession" carry an unpleasant
connotation for most Iranians who criticized the policy as measures which pawned the
country for a pittance.
Besides financial borrowing, at least from the first
decades of the twentieth century a number of enterprising- real or self-titled-
businessmen arrived from abroad in search of local partners specifically for projects in
the manufacturing sector. One result was establishment of a number of workshops and small
factories to make matches, glass, sugar bits and the like. However, almost none of these
took off the ground. Factors such as undeveloped infrastructures, lack of work discipline
and, unfortunately, the absence of business scruples of some of those entrepreneurs were
responsible.
Disappointing though the fates of these ventures
proved to be, they gave the country a pool of experience about positive and negative sides
of foreign economic participation and the need to approach it in a systematic way.
Consequently, in 1921 the first company Law of the country was enacted by the Majlis in
which direct references were made to foreign investment. Article 3 of the Act made it
compulsory for any foreign national who wished to enter into business activity in Iran to
undergo the formalities of registering a company. [This Article was amended in 1955 when
entry of foreign investment was made subject to a new set of requirements]. It is
interesting to note that among the first companies - Iranian or otherwise- to register
under the Act were a number of foreign companies, at least one of which has survived to
this day.
Modernizing Investment Rules: The decade 1920s was
notable for the changes to the political face of the region, and consequently, this
country. In that decade commenced the process of industrialization of the economy which,
notwithstanding its social and political side-effects, necessitated a greater deal of
interaction with the rest of the world. Though direct foreign investment in the usual form
was rare, the country resorted to importation of machinery, know-how and skills for use in
industrial projects.
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of direct foreign
investment was still in its early youth until the conclusion of the Second World War. With
all its heinous implications, the War seems to have set free economic energies which had
been suppressed by antiquated institutional straitjackets. Among these was the great
technological progress which, on the one hand, raised the wealth of industrial nations.
And on the other hand, turned the non-industrial parts of the world into essential
components of an increasingly internationalized economic system.
The War, also, tolled the bells for old colonial
powers. No only global center of economic and political gravity shifted away from colonial
metropolitan state, there also emerged a large number of independent countries whose
leaders were keen to make up for lost decades and centuries of economic underdevelopment
by acquiring the basic means to industrialize.
The economic map of the world in the decade following
the War was interesting, and for the first time, consistent with modern technological
imperatives, Industrial countries had to turn to export of technologies which were no
longer suited to their local factor endowment. And developing ones created the market to
import them. Consequently, technology embodied in capital became a commodity with its own
international market and made for a great leap forward in the process of direct foreign
investment in its different forms.
Iran was no exception and the idea of industrial
development, beginning with import substitution industrialization, was uppermost in the
minds of planners. This called for a fresh look at the subject of industrial development
and the place of foreign contribution to it. Thus was born the Attraction and Protection
of Foreign Investment Act of 1955.
Even now, the 1955 Act, despite getting on in age,
deserves serious attention. For one thing, even though an heir is expected, it continues
to regulate foreign participation in the Iranian economy. For one thin, even though an
heir is expected, it continues to regulate foreign participation in the Iranian economy.
For another, the way it was prepared, approved and amended has a great deal to tell us
about interdependence among various components of the overall investment environment.
The Act offered a satisfactory definition of direct
foreign investment by including finance, machinery, know how, and the like which could
"develop ... productive capacity in industrial, agricultural and transport
industries" of Iran.
Services were notable for their absence. Apparently,
makers of the Bill had the overall objectives of the development plan of the time in the
back of their minds and were looking at foreign projects which would supplement, rather
than supplant, the indigenous enterprise. They were, also, aware of the problems of the
economy in terms of exchange, technology, enterprise and infrastructure bottlenecks.
According to the Law, the foreign investor had to be
a private individual or corporate person. Apparently, with the trouble over
nationalization of the oil sector in 1951-53 period still fresh in everyone's mind, the
fear was that the national government might again face a challenge in its jurisdiction
over sectors of the economy. Any foreign state participation had to be of a specific
duration and be terminated when this expired.
The Act mean to combine two apparently contradictory
objectives into one. The first was to counter Iranians' historical suspicion of
unregulated foreign participation in the economy. The second, to allay the fear of
potential investors that nationalization of foreign assets might have been habit forming
after the oil nationalization episode in which foreign control over the sector was ended
by the state.
Companion Order: It is important to note that the
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment Act of 1955 was not addressing what is
named "joint investment" in the technical sense of the word and as one type of
foreign investment. Rather, the Law, which is still valid, dealt with the subject in its
more general form.
Equipped with the outlines of the Law, in October
1956 the Majlis formed a special committee to draw up the Executive Order containing the
mode of implementation of the Law. The order offered foreign companies set up under the
auspices of the Act the same business facilities open to Iranian corporate bodies. It
emphasized the private nature of foreign investment once more. On repatriation, the Order
made no restrictions apart from the usual proviso that profits earned had to pay before
leaving the country.
Other sections of the Law and its companion Order
deal with various contingencies which might arise in the process of investing in Iran and
repatriation the profit. At the same time, they reflected the general state of the economy
in that particular point in time.
After the oil nationalization crisis was resolved in
1953, the economy received a temporary respite through the belated inflow of quantities of
foreign aid and loans. But despite improvements in macro-economic indicators, it was clear
that structure of the economy and social system has remained relatively unchanged. This
was, perhaps instinctively, sensed by both Iranian experts and potential foreign
investors. a comparison between available figures for foreign investment in two periods
before and after the passage of the Act seem to vindicate this . Foreign investment inflow
for the period 1949-56 was around US $70m. while the corresponding figure for 1956-63 was
only slightly higher at US $80m. Correcting for the state of the economy during the
1950-53 oil nationalization period when inflow of capital was negligible, and for the
changes in the real value of the dollar, the conclusion is that the Act had little
practical effect in the absence of more solid economic developments.
Subsequent Changes: The legal status of foreign
investment was again mentioned in 1960 when the Majlis legislated the Banking and Money
Act. The change was, however, only about the administrative arrangements. The 1955-56
package had created an investment investigating Council composed of several ministers and
high ranking officials chaired by the Minister of Finance. The new Act transferred the
chairmanship to the Government or of the newly established Central Bank.
Though of little economic importance, the change had
to do with different economic circumstances. In 1960, the country was facing a severe
recession which tightened exchange and savings bottlenecks. As a result, attentions were
focused on the cash in flow part of foreign investment which, on the whole, is an
unhealthy attitude to adopt.
The recession came to an abrupt end through certain
changes in Iran's foreign standing, consequently, in 1961, the Council went to a more
appropriate organization and was placed under the Ministry of Economy with the Minister,
or his chief deputy, as chairman.
Both the 1955-6 and 1960-61 developments had their
roots in the general state of the economy. With differing intensities, both periods
witnessed the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class which was still too weak to
undertake major industrial projects. The private sector was entrusted with the task of
catering for the light consumers industrial sector, while the state took upon itself
larger, heavy industrial projects. In the middle, foreign investors were expected to
inject into the economy the needed exchange and more importantly, enterprise and known-how
required for a smoother, more balanced course of industrial development. In this the
planners seem to have been quite successful- at least in terms of the quantity of
investment received. Compared to 1950 - 63, foreign investment inflow increased several
folds to the phenomenal figure of over $2.5bn.
Enter Joint Venture: Both the 1955 Act, its 1956
Order and other pieces of rules and regulations tended to treat foreign investment in its
most original form; a non- national committing his funds and enterprise to a specific
project. Whit the passage of time, earlier misgivings about local risk to foreign capital
had subsided and Iran seemed as good as any, and better than many, places in taking good
care of foreign businesses. But radical changes lay ahead.
From the middle of 1960s, the idea that foreign
investment might open a window to admit neocolonial infiltration had become endemic in
Third World public opinion. Though by no stretch of imagination, the Iranian government of
the time could be seen overtly worried about such concepts, still most people preferred
less foreign investment to more, if this could be helped. The problem was that it could
not, since much of what the developing countries required had no vehicle other than
foreign investment. In these conditions, the 1970s arrived.
The opening years of the decade were full of
surprise, or shock, depending on which side one was looking from. For the first time in
modern history, the world was pushed into a different setting without a war or a
revolution. For the first time, the instigators were not the mighty and the big, but a
group of developing countries who got together to look after their common interest. With
an unprecedented degree of political self restraint and maturity, members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries voice their dissatisfaction at the shares in
the proceeds from the sale of their resources.
For Iran, the most important one was the fact that
the problem of exchange shortage - a feature of almost all developing countries-seemed to
have been given an easy solution . In a few calculated steps, and within a few years,
export revenues of the country rose from a few hundred million to several billion dollars.
It is easy today to complain that in many cases, OPEC
governments of the time failed to put the newly gained wealth to the most constructive
developmental use. But to them, just as easy riches from colonial possessions had prepared
the grounds for industrialization of advanced countries, petrodollars were the gift of
history of perform the same miracle themselves. While their Western critics rejected the
whole spectacle as something against the "natural law of pricing" and insisted
than oil prices were to be set at the production cost, the producers were sure that they
were getting just about their rightful share in the sale of resources which were being
depleted with every mile a car drove anywhere in the world.
Naturally, the fields of foreign trade and investment
were affected more than any, and almost immediately after the price rise came about. In
exports sector, the domestic market expanded tremendously almost overnight. In 1973, the
government adopted the much criticized measure to revise all expenditure items of its
current development plan upwards. This affected investment plans of both the government
and the private sector.
Unfortunately, it seems that in the excitement of
doing everything rapidly, one important point slipped planner's minds. That it was sue to
the careless use of economic terminology that people never made clear the distinction
between capital as a means of access to productive capacity itself. To the Iranian
authorities, the petrodollar was the magic wand which, once wielded by the politician,
would grant him his development wishes. In fact nothing could be further from truth.
Injection of exchange into the economy increased the
level of domestic consumption which could be met through imports. It also removed any
exchange barriers to productive investment since machines could be selected and bought
right from the pages of the manufacturers' catalogues. But the mere physical presence of
machinery did not ensure the existence of productive capacity. Very soon, various
bottlenecks cropped up especially in such sensitive areas as semi-skilled manpower and
infrastructures. But they were to come later. At the time, the idea of forcing the economy
grow at figures which looked more mathematical than economic, was contagious among many
government planners and officials. And to that end, all means at hand had to be used.
Among changes to various rules and regulations, the
role of foreign investment in the expected growth was decided by the Economic and
Financial Act of 1974. The Act re-christened the foreign investment Council and made it
the Organization for Investment and Economic and Technological Assistance of Iran,
abbreviated to OIETAL which was still quite a mouthful. The new body was now placed under
the newly formed Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs and was given more discretion
than its predecessor.
The most important aspect of the new piece of
legislation and the relevant rules and regulations which subsequently appeared was the
formal introduction of the concept of joint ventures. The former act had allowed foreign
investment without specifying its relation with potential indigenous investors. The
initiative, then, came from the foreign investor. Now, the country was not in need of
foreign cash and the national market was growing fast enough to make the mounts of any
trader water. At the same time, the experience of previous two decades had resulted in the
emergence of a relatively enterprising investor class in the country. In dividing the
perks, they were to have the first pick with the hope that in time, they might do what all
responsible capitalists are supposed to do: invest and expand the modern sectors of the
economy.
On the whole, the 1974 laws and regulations reflected
the new state of the economy and its needs as perceived by the government. The first was
to attract that kind of technology which the indigenous entrepreneur was not able to
provide and manage. And secondly, to save the lion's share of the market for the local,
rather than foreign businesses.
Both requirements were supposed to be met by the Act.
we may add, without openly offending the rest of the world. Thus, the most important
section dealt with the question of ownership. Now, foreign investment shares were limited
to 49% of the total unless, of course, special concessions were granted on merit. Again ,
commerce was not included among acceptable proposals, unless directly connected with a
"production' project . Repatriation of the accrued profit was assured, and the
government was responsible for protection of the enterprise against normal legal
risks-such as confiscation.
Post-1979 Restatement of Intention: In February 1979,
the Monarchy was replaced by revolutionary government. In April the formal title of the
county was changed to the Islamic Republic: and a few months later, its Constitution was
written and approved.
A revolution, as the term suggests, aims at as
comprehensive a social change as stated by its principles. The Islamic revolution was no
exception. Among the changes were those directly or indirectly affecting the future of the
economy. In a formal way, these began by the same Constitutional Law which devoted a
section to economic matters. Among them, Article 81 dealt with the subject of foreign
participation. The Article proscribed granting of any "concessions" to
non-nationals to enter various sectors of the domestic economy.
At the time the Constitution was prepared, the
country was passing the aftermath of the revolution and the process of fundamental change
was still in progress. Thus, the opinion of the "Mother of all Laws" about the
issue of foreign participation did not receive the full attention of the public. The
experts, however, seemed to be satisfied.
To understand the state of the mind of the writers of
the Law, we have to go no further than review the history of foreign investment in Iran.
In particular, meaning of the term concession, referring to near monopoly rights given to
foreign subjects at the turn of the century, and their dire consequences, was vivid
enough. A repeat performance was not allowed. But what about other forms of participation?
Fortunately, the proceedings of the constituent
assembly are available and many of those who either served as members or watched them at
work are with us. To cut a long story shore, economic historians and analysts assure us
that the intention of the authors of the constitution, understandably circumspect, was not
to prohibit international economic cooperation. The ban on "granting of
concession" not only was confined to "monopolistic rights", it in fact had
foreign monopoly control over basic economic sectors in mind.
Be it as it may, the actual directives of the Law
have to be derived from its contents and the way authorized institutions have interpreted
them. And the most reliable sources in this case are the rulings by the Custodian Council
in charge of safeguarding the Constitution.
Soon after the approval of the Law, an occasion arose
to put Article 81 to a practical test. That was in 1981 when the head of the government
appealed to the Custodian Council for ruling over joint venture participation with foreign
investors. The Iranian side was as state entity. In his reply, the Secretary of the
Council assured the government that the project could go ahead and did not "require
legislation by the Majlis". Then, in 1985, the premier, probably after being
questioned about the subject and having investigated the legal grounds, issued a circular
to government departments in which the same sentiment was expressed. In the same year, the
Direct Taxation Act, passed by the Majlis and endorsed by the Custodian Council, contained
a specific reference to taxes levied on incomes of foreign corporate bodies.
Of course, these legal statements were not of much
interests during the decade following the revolution of 1979. The revolution was followed
by an external war which drained the economic, political and diplomatic resources of the
country for eight long years. Yet, although the general conditions of the country were
hardly conducive to appearance of foreign investment, foreign economic participation
continued in a low key. The most popular and feasible context at the time was the buy-back
method. Though criticized for its trade diversion results, the policy proved one point at
least. That it was not the intention of the Islamic government to ban foreign investment.
More earnest pursuit of this, and other economic
objectives, was left to the conclusion of hostilities in 1988 and the declaration of the
political will to attend to the economy with the publication of the text of the Plan Bill
the following year. The Bill, and the resultant Act, contained specific references to the
subject of foreign capital. Dealing with state investment programs, the Act allowed
foreign participation of up to $ 10bn. in five years.
At the same time, it was made clear that the
government was keen to promote economic growth by reconstruction and restructuring of the
economy. The main proposal was revival of the private sector, dormant for a decade as an
important agent of development. Naturally, foreign participation, up to then mainly
confined to the public sector, was now opened to all interested businessmen in and outside
the country. In support of this notion, high ranking officials made it clear that the IRI
was interested in appropriate types of foreign investment and would offer legal facilities
for their promotion.
The legal facilities, as it turned out, were
contained in the investment Act of 1955 and its subsequent amendments. The text was
prepared and published an early as 1989 to indicated the readiness of Iran to partake of
international capital transfer.
Future Steps: Although the provisions of the existing
laws and regulations are by no means restrictive, in order to clarify the situation and
counter misgivings about the legal and institutional approach of the IRI to the subject,
there have been reports of a new piece of legislation being prepared. The text of the
proposed bill has not been made public, but its main points have been hinted upon by
informed sources.
Perhaps the most significant contribution it makes to
the investment environment of the country is the reiteration that the 49-51% share
division is not final, and is open to negotiation. In other parts, it removes worries
about the effect of uncontrolled exchange rate fluctuations by assuring the investor that
his profits, and principle, are transferable at the officially set rate of conversion.
Also, the question of protection of foreign assets in specifically turned to.
Hopefully, the new law will soon appear on the statue
books and remove existing ambiguities. Equipped with clear legal guidelines, and with
appropriate institutional backing, the country can take an active part in the field of
international investment. That is an essential prerequisite of economic development today.
After all, the main goal of bringing about a more integrated world economic system is to
arrive at optimum allocation of global resources. That is what the whole science of
economics, from the time of classical pessimists to the present-day business consultants
has been about.
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